Friday, February 24, 2012

Warning: Active Management Is Dangerous to Your Wealth

Last week in Measuring Uncertainty I focused on the pitfalls of using performance alone to measure progress toward reaching your financial goals. It’s only natural to use returns because they are the universal language of the financial services industry. And if the language of the industry is returns, then the methodology for producing them is active management; where managers make specific investments with the primary goal of outperforming an investment benchmark index. But with return alone as your guide, you are left to wonder just how effectively your managers are improving your situation relative to your goals, how are they managing your wealth?

While some managers may beat their benchmarks, occasionally with stellar returns, there is no guarantee they improve your wealth. Active managers are expensive, generate significant taxes, and will eventually under-perform their benchmarks. They concentrate investments in less than fully diversified positions in order to better their benchmark, thereby exposing your wealth to greater risk than you may know about or need. The concentrated positions can make your investments considerably more volatile than the indexes against which they are measured, encouraging irrational decisions driven by fear or greed.

As a rule, actively managed portfolios are significantly more expensive than passive funds (those that match an index). Large salaries and bonuses are required for the smart people who direct the management investment decisions. Lots of transactions are required to position the portfolio among companies, industries, and sectors as directed by their managers. These transactions incur commission charges from the brokers executing the trades and they suffer another meaningful but rarely mentioned expense known as the spread (the difference between what is paid for a stock and what it is sold for). The spread, which ranges from a few pennies to a half percent or more, goes to the market maker of a stock, and it dissapears from your wealth every  time a stock is bought or sold. A study done by the Wharton School of Business in 1999 found that mutual fund trading costs, which are not reported in prospectuses, averaged .78%. That’s more than three quarters of a percent the managers have to clear just to beat their benchmark.

Typically, when you buy a mutual fund you pay a sales charge of as much as 5.75%. Add that to the internal expenses of the fund which can range between .25% and 2% and you begin to see the challenge of simply catching up to where you could start with an index fund. If you bought a typical growth fund and paid the 5.75% up front commission, and incurred an ongoing .7% internal fund expense ratio, your fund would have to clear 1.83% a year for five years, just to break even with the benchmark index. But wait, there’s more . . . don’t forget the .78% that Wharton says is hidden among mutual funds’ expenses. Are you beginning to sense the magnitude of the challenge? If a mutual fund is going to offer any value at all to you in improving your wealth, the manager must scale a hurdle of more than 2.6% annually just to match the return you can get by duplicating his benchmark with index funds. 

What we’ve been talking about so far concerns the margin or amount funds' returns exceed or fall short of their benchmarks. Fund managers can employ all kinds of shenanigans between quarterly reports to improve their returns, and these actions usually subject the fund, and your wealth to more risk than is inherent in the performance benchmarks. One way to check is to compare the fund’s beta to that of its benchmark index. Beta provides a measure of the volatility of a security or a portfolio relative to a benchmark. If, for example, the manager of a domestic growth fund allocates say 15% of his holdings to international stocks, he has added greater risk in the form of volatility to his portfolio than is contained in the benchmark (i.e. currency, credit, and small cap volatility to name a few). His fund will likely carry a beta over 1.

Alpha on the other hand measures the fund’s ability to produce returns beyond those that can be captured through a combination of low-cost index funds matching the makeup of the fund. This measure provides a better gauge of whether the manager provides value beyond simply owning the indexes.

Vanguard, a champion of low cost index funds, recently did a study to determine the probability of selecting funds that offer superior alpha. In their introduction they note that “talented managers can deliver better than-benchmark returns, and it’s easy enough to identify managers who have produced alpha in the past. Unfortunately, these historical feats shed little light on a fund’s future."

The study used the Morningstar database of the returns of actively managed mutual funds from 1990 through 2010. They calculated alphas relative to the stock market’s four common risk factors, as outlined by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997):

  • Market risk factor (the difference between the returns of the broad stock market and risk-free U.S. Treasury bills);
  • SMB risk factor (a measure of the historical difference between the returns of small- and large-cap stocks; SMB refers to “small [market cap] minus big”);
  • HML risk factor (a measure of the historical difference between the returns of stocks with high book-to-market and low book-to-market values; HML refers to “high [book-to-market ratio] minus low”); and
  • Momentum risk factor (the historical difference between the returns of stocks with the highest returns over the past 3 to 12 months and those with the lowest).
For each of the rolling 36-month periods in the database, they grouped the funds in quartiles from lowest alpha to highest alpha. They then calculated the probability that a top-quartile fund would remain a top-quartile performer over the following 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods, as shown below:


“The figure presents two sets of probabilities, one calculated from a database free of survivorship bias (which includes records both of existing funds and those no longer in existence) and a database that is survivor-biased (eliminates the funds which have ceased to exist). The results based on the two datasets were different, but both led to the same conclusion: The probability that the highest-alpha funds will remain the highest-alpha funds in subsequent periods was no better—and was sometimes worse—than chance. (In a random distribution, we would expect to see 25% of the top-quartile performers in that same quartile in future periods.)”

The study's authors noted “the survivor-bias-free dataset is more reflective of an investor’s real-world experience. An investor’s long-term challenge is to identify a fund that can both outperform and stay in business long enough to deliver that outperformance to shareholders.

If you are curious about why the beige bias-free probabilities are lower, the reason is simple math, notes the authors. While the numerators (top number) were similar in both datasets, the denominators differed. The denominator of the beige bias-free dataset included both surviving and non-surviving funds and was hence larger than the denominator of the blue survivor-biased funds.

The study concluded by saying “unfortunately, the quantitative evidence of this skill—alpha and other measures of historical performance—is of little help in identifying tomorrow’s superior performers. The elements that distinguish talented investment managers are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in a simple metric. Active management is both art and science. Talent exists, it produces alpha, but its basis can’t be captured in a mechanical formula.

If your objective is to improve wealth, then it is fair to say that the odds are stacked pretty highly against you if you choose to go the way of actively managed mutual funds. They are expensive and are apt to underperform. But there’s another problem. The trading that goes on in their daily management and to accommodate buyers and sellers of the fund both generate significant taxable income. If you own mutual funds in taxable accounts, you will mostly likely be hit with short and long-term capital gains at year’s end even if you didn’t sell a share. That’s because mutual funds are required to pass their capital gains and losses to shareholders each year. These taxable gains can be material. Returns on average can be reduced by 2% or more. Taxes of this kind are a steady and unnecessary leak of your wealth.

A study by Blackrock reveals just how extensive the damage to your wealth the tax costs of active management can be. The table below represents the impact of various tax cost assumptions on a portfolio of $1 million growing at 8% for 10 years. You should not be surprised to find that the tax cost of some of the most popular mutual funds easily clears 2%. In the figure below note that the impact of a 2% tax cost annually can reduce your wealth by as much as $400,000 over a ten year period. These are losses or leaks that CAN BE REDUCED, AND POSSIBLY ELIMINATED.

In my 30 years advising clients, I have found that the most persistent wealth destroyer is emotions. Investors who make decisions based on fear or greed are highly apt to sacrifice big chunks of their wealth needlessly. Active management plays a significant role in contributing to these behavioral mistakes. As a performance manager for 25 of my 30 years I am all too familiar with the warning signs. “What do you think about the market ahead? “What do you think about gold?” “Should we buy some Apple shares – they’ve doubled in the last three years?” “My barber says he’s got a year’s worth of canned goods in his basement.” “Should we park some money on the sidelines until things settle down a little?”

The actively managed marketplace known as the financial services industry provides a cornucopia of choices from 'zero' risk to Katie-bar-the-door. They are sold by appealing primarily to clients' natural fear or greed, and all too rarely what is best for their unique wealth needs. And when investors make decisions on emotion they are apt to seriously impact their wealth.

The figure below represents another study done by Blackrock. It represents the lost opportunity of sitting on the sidelines while the stock market (S&P 500) delivers its best months of performance. If I had a dollar for every time I heard “I wish I had gotten back into the market last. . . .”  

The S&P 500 appreciated 124% from the period 1/97 to 12/06, yet those who missed the best 10 months of that 10-year period did not even beat the returns of 3-month T-Bills - a huge sacrifice of wealth lost while they hunkered down.


When a managed portfolio experiences volatility beyond that of a widely reported benchmark, like say the S&P 500, then shareholders tend to panic and get out more often. Conversely, if a portfolio is constructed with market-efficient fixed and equity index funds or ETFs that provides more consistent returns, with lower volatility than say the S&P 500, then investors might be expected to stay invested, accumulating wealth for future needs – true?

The objective in building a market-efficient portfolio is to maximize the portfolio’s expected return for a given amount of portfolio risk, or alternatively to minimize risk for a given level of expected return, by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets, essentially fixed (bonds) and equities (stocks).

We use six standard model portfolios that are efficient relative to the capital market assumptions developed by Wealthcare Capital Management. People often ask how we did during the Great Recession, particularly over the 2008 market period. Because we are wealth managers and not performance managers my answers generally focus on the experiences of our clients. The short answer is that our clients were relatively content by comparison to other investors riding out the storm. Our phones did not ring any more than usual and we did not have to talk a single client out of bailing.
The graph below provides a visual explanation of why our more risk-sensitive clients remained confident. The blue line represents our most conservative portfolio (Risk Averse). The red line is the S&P 500 and the green line represents the 7-10 year US Treasury index.

Wealthcare’s studies have found that 7-10 year Treasuries provide the best offset to equity risk. When stocks are declining, Treasuries, historically rise in value, offsetting the potential wealth-erosion in their absence.  As you can see below, the Treasuries (which represent 60% of the Risk Averse Portfolio) did exactly what they were supposed to do. They pulled the blue line - our client's wealth - up as the red line was pulling it in the opposit direction.


When using the capital markets to accumulate and grow wealth, active management has numerous pitfalls. As wealth advisors we believe that by using market-efficient portfolios to control what is controllable; costs, taxes, and under-market performance, and by continually measuring uncertainty, we can confidently help our clients exceed their important goals and aspirations.

Have a great weekend.

Friday, February 17, 2012

Measuring Uncertainty

In the investment process there are things which can be controlled; such as expenses, taxes, and under-performing market indices, and there are things that cannot; the uncertainty of markets. It is, however, quite possible to measure uncertainty not only of historical market returns, but also of potential market returns. So why is it important for investors to measure uncertainty and how is it measured?

This Brief is based on a whitepaper entitled Understanding Monte Carlo Simulation, written by David Loeper in 2005. The whitepaper was written for financial advisors and contains substantially more analytical proofs than will be provided here. I will try hard to keep the industry-speak and statistical terms to a minimum.

One of life’s greatest fears is that of the unknown. When I talk to new clients and ask what concerns them most, their answers usually involve general uncertainty about the future around them and specific uncertainty about their own financial future. Of course a highly competitive and ubiquitous media bellowing out dire forecasts doesn’t help.

As wealth advisors we often find ourselves explaining how misleading the concept of returns taken on their own can be. It’s easy to understand why we rely on return to gauge progress – it seems to provide a benchmark for effective comparison: 1) relative to other investment choices and 2) as a measure of how well we are doing relative to our own goals.

The first comparison is obvious. If Fund A returned 7% for the past 10 years and Fund B returned 8% during the same period, the choice between them is made simple. The second return concept is based on the widely practiced methodology of planning with a conservative and steady rate of return. For example: If we could grow our money at say 7% a year for the next 20 years, then get a 7% return during retirement, that would yield us enough income to meet our spending goals for the rest of our life.

There are a number of problems with this simple model, the most obvious and significant is uncertainty. Everyone knows that markets are uncertain and that projecting consistent returns well into the future is at best, wishful thinking. Nevertheless, the industry and investors alike both rely heavily on returns for both selection of assets and for determining how well they are doing relative to their goals.

Mutual funds and single managed accounts use returns to tout their individual outperformance relative to their peers.  The problem with this practice is that returns alone do not tell the whole story.

Consider the following example. If an investor received 7% every year, his return would obviously average 7%. Now let’s mix in a little uncertainty by adding a 21% return and a loss of 7% in the first year and the 5th year and compare it to the opposite placement.

Scenario A
Scenario B
Return
Return
Portfolio
Return
Return
Portfolio
Year
in %
in $
value
Year
in %
in $
value
$100
$100
1
21%
$21
$121
1
-7%
($7)
$93
2
7%
$8
$129
2
7%
$7
$100
3
7%
$9
$139
3
7%
$7
$106
4
7%
$10
$148
4
7%
$7
$114
5
-7%
($10)
$138
5
21%
$24
$138
7%
Average
7%
Average

As you can see, it doesn’t matter when the good year and when the bad years occur, both scenarios still average 7%. But what's missing from this example? In order to reflect reality we need to add some savings or some spending. While there may be a few timecapsule investors in the world, we don’t have any clients who drop off a pile of money and say nothing more than “let it ride.” Yet this is the way mutual funds and single account managers report their value to you, but they take no responsibility for the timing of your spending or saving decisions.

Why does cash flow timing matter? Consider another example. This time we’ll take a couple who have just entered their retirement years and plan on spending 7% annually for the next 30 years. As before, we will add a great return year at 21% and a bad return year at -7% in reciprocal order to the two scenarios.


Good Return Early
Good Return Late
Return
Return
Contrib
Portfolio
Return
Return
Contrib
Portfolio
Year
in %
in $
(Withd)
Value
Year
in %
in $
(Withd)
Value
$100
$100
1
21%
$21
($7)
$114
1
-7%
($7)
($7)
$86
2
7%
$8
($7)
$115
2
7%
$6
($7)
$85
3
7%
$8
($7)
$116
3
7%
$6
($7)
$84
4
7%
$8
($7)
$117
4
7%
$6
($7)
$83
5
7%
$8
($7)
$118
5
7%
$6
($7)
$82
6
7%
$8
($7)
$120
6
7%
$6
($7)
$80
7
7%
$8
($7)
$121
7
7%
$6
($7)
$79
8
7%
$8
($7)
$122
8
7%
$6
($7)
$78
9
7%
$9
($7)
$124
9
7%
$5
($7)
$76
10
7%
$9
($7)
$126
10
7%
$5
($7)
$74
11
7%
$9
($7)
$128
11
7%
$5
($7)
$72
12
7%
$9
($7)
$129
12
7%
$5
($7)
$71
13
7%
$9
($7)
$132
13
7%
$5
($7)
$68
14
7%
$9
($7)
$134
14
7%
$5
($7)
$66
15
7%
$9
($7)
$136
15
7%
$5
($7)
$64
16
7%
$10
($7)
$139
16
7%
$4
($7)
$61
17
7%
$10
($7)
$141
17
7%
$4
($7)
$59
18
7%
$10
($7)
$144
18
7%
$4
($7)
$56
19
7%
$10
($7)
$147
19
7%
$4
($7)
$53
20
7%
$10
($7)
$151
20
7%
$4
($7)
$49
21
7%
$11
($7)
$154
21
7%
$3
($7)
$46
22
7%
$11
($7)
$158
22
7%
$3
($7)
$42
23
7%
$11
($7)
$162
23
7%
$3
($7)
$38
24
7%
$11
($7)
$166
24
7%
$3
($7)
$34
25
7%
$12
($7)
$171
25
7%
$2
($7)
$29
26
7%
$12
($7)
$176
26
7%
$2
($7)
$24
27
7%
$12
($7)
$181
27
7%
$2
($7)
$19
28
7%
$13
($7)
$187
28
7%
$1
($7)
$13
29
7%
$13
($7)
$193
29
7%
$1
($7)
$7
30
-7%
($14)
($7)
$173
30
21%
$1
($7)
$1
7%
Average
7%
Average

The average returns are exactly the same, but the wealth outcomes are dramatically different. Receiving the good return early provided $172 more in wealth than the couple who ‘enjoyed’ the good return late in life. No doubt the couple on the right side spent their last few years worrying whether their nest egg would last.

Intuitively, we understand that a better return on a larger principal balance provides greater wealth. So now let’s add a twist to fool our intuition (the planning tool of choice for entirely too many people). Assume that the wife of our retired couple had a ten-year teacher’s pension that would provide not only for the couple’s living expenses, but a $6 annual surplus which could be saved.



Good Return Early
Good Return Late
Return
Return
Contrib
Portfolio
Return
Return
Contrib
Portfolio
Year
in %
in $
(Withd)
Value
Year
in %
in $
(Withd)
Value
$100
$100
1
21%
$21
$6
$127
1
-7%
($7)
$6
$99
2
7%
$9
$6
$142
2
7%
$7
$6
$112
3
7%
$10
$6
$158
3
7%
$8
$6
$126
4
7%
$11
$6
$175
4
7%
$9
$6
$141
5
7%
$12
$6
$193
5
7%
$10
$6
$156
6
7%
$14
$6
$213
6
7%
$11
$6
$173
7
7%
$15
$6
$234
7
7%
$12
$6
$191
8
7%
$16
$6
$256
8
7%
$13
$6
$211
9
7%
$18
$6
$280
9
7%
$15
$6
$232
10
7%
$20
$6
$305
10
7%
$16
$6
$254
11
7%
$21
($7)
$320
11
7%
$18
($7)
$265
12
7%
$22
($7)
$335
12
7%
$19
($7)
$276
13
7%
$23
($7)
$352
13
7%
$19
($7)
$289
14
7%
$25
($7)
$369
14
7%
$20
($7)
$302
15
7%
$26
($7)
$388
15
7%
$21
($7)
$316
16
7%
$27
($7)
$408
16
7%
$22
($7)
$331
17
7%
$29
($7)
$430
17
7%
$23
($7)
$347
18
7%
$30
($7)
$453
18
7%
$24
($7)
$364
19
7%
$32
($7)
$478
19
7%
$26
($7)
$383
20
7%
$33
($7)
$504
20
7%
$27
($7)
$403
21
7%
$35
($7)
$532
21
7%
$28
($7)
$424
22
7%
$37
($7)
$562
22
7%
$30
($7)
$447
23
7%
$39
($7)
$595
23
7%
$31
($7)
$471
24
7%
$42
($7)
$630
24
7%
$33
($7)
$497
25
7%
$44
($7)
$667
25
7%
$35
($7)
$525
26
7%
$47
($7)
$706
26
7%
$37
($7)
$554
27
7%
$49
($7)
$749
27
7%
$39
($7)
$586
28
7%
$52
($7)
$794
28
7%
$41
($7)
$620
29
7%
$56
($7)
$843
29
7%
$43
($7)
$656
30
-7%
($59)
($7)
$777
30
21%
$138
($7)
$787
7%
Average
7%
Average

In this case we see that the Good Return Early did not outperform wealth-wise the Good Return Late, which is the exact opposite of what we might expect when considering the time value of money. The couple on the right was slightly better off by experiencing the loss in the first year and waiting until the last year to get the bonus return.

Now, remember that money managers and mutual funds do not take responsibility for the wealth impact on your unique savings or spending decisions, they simply generate returns in a relative vacuum where your individual goals are concerned. We have demonstrated that injecting just two years of uncertainty into a 30-year lifetime can have a dramatic impact on wealth. So we now know that the timing of returns relative to cash flows has a dramatic impact on your wealth and it is uncertain.

Advisors who know their clients well have a good idea of their expected cash flows such as when they want to spend their money and how much they want to spend over the course of our lives. The best advisors know each of these values in ranges of acceptable to ideal and they have worked with their clients to rank their goals according to priority ‘spending’ from their less important goals in order to accomplish the more important ones at their ideal levels sooner. But what the best of planners cannot know is how their clients’ cash flows will align with the uncertain timing of market returns. How can the advisor model uncertainty to help his clients be more confident and make better decisions? That’s where Monte Carlo comes in.

Quite simply, Monte Carlo is a probability analysis tool for modeling randomness of returns. The examples illustrate how dramatically injecting just two random returns into two 30-year lifetimes can alter outcomes, clearly demonstrating the need for a tool that can measure uncertainty and promote significantly more informed decisions.

Dave Loeper describes the Monte Carlo process in his whitepaper as follows. Begin with a spreadsheet of cash flows and asset levels etc. Fill a bowl with slips of paper where each one contains an historical market return. Shake the bowl as in a raffle to ensure the returns are scrambled and random. Draw a slip with a return on it, record it in my spread sheet as the return in the first year, but unlike a raffle, return the paper to the bowl, shake it and draw another slip for year two...and so on. Each slip is returned to the bowl because individual market returns have no memory. We don’t want to rule out the possibility that the same return might not occur again.

Repeat this routine for all thirty years and we would have one ‘lifetime’ result or a “trial.” The average return and risk of thirty “draws” would vary each time the exercise was repeated and the “could be higher than the average of all the numbers in the bowl (depending on if I were lucky and drew a disproportionate amount of high returns), or lower than the average (if I were unlucky and drew an excessive number of low returns.) Also there would be some outcomes that might average a higher than normal result but bad timing of when I draw a slip of paper might cause an unpleasant outcome, or I might have a lower than average result with fortunate timing that ends up exceeding the client’s goals none-the-less.” Returns alone don’t tell the story

To get a sense of confidence of the client’s odds (chances) of exceeding his goals, we need more than just one or two “trials.” Dave continues “If I had the patience to draw the numbers for 500 or 1000 trials (drawing 15,000 or 30,000 slips- one slip for each year of each 30 year trial), I would have a better understanding of how confident the client could be. Clearly with that many samples, odds are that I would have drawn Great Depression types of results, back to back with the bear market of ‘73-’74 and probably the bear market of ‘00-’02 too.”

In a basic sense the examples describe how Monte Carlo works. But there is considerably more to the procdess. For instance, even with our data going back as far as 1926, there is the chance that the markets may not have demonstrated their worst returns or therir best yet. Instead of simply filling the bowl with only actual market returns, we must add statistically “possible” results as well. Dave says that “by doing this we would be able to measure not only the uncertainty of historical returns but also of future potential returns. This additional step helps us to make sure we do not ignore the chance that we have not yet seen the worst (or the best) of what the markets might produce.”

There’s another problem to recognize. The time-frame of the data universe can have significant impact on the results of the model. Dave asks what if the bowl was filled with numbers from just the last 25 years instead of going back to 1926? The 25-year period ending in 2003 produced a compound return that fell in the top 16% of all historical 25-year periods. While there would be a lot of trials that still produced poor results, half of the trials would exceed the top 16% of all his­torical 25-year periods. In essence I would be telling my client that from now on there is a 50% chance the markets will do better than most historical periods. The reverse could be true as well, if for example I used just the last five years that was dominated by a bear market. If I filled the bowl with numbers like those, I would be simulating half of all the trials doing worse than the bottom 10% of all five year peri­ods.”

Next, we need to ensure that the returns in the bowl, or the computer model, are not overly optimistic or pessimistic relative to the nature of markets. Dave suggests that “to control [outsized results] and make the confidence result materially meaningful, a great deal of diligence therefore must go into figuring out how many slips of paper have what numbers on them (or in the case of a computer, the mean, standard deviation and shape of the distribution we are asking the random number generator to create for us.)”

These inputs are known as Capital Market Assumptions or CMAs. Dave says that the CMAs “are just as critical as modeling the uncertainty of returns because if they are overly biased one way or the other we are either misrepresent­ing how confident the client can be, or, being overly conservative causing the client to needlessly sacrifice their lifestyle” by saving more, working longer, or sacrificing goals he might have enjoyed in life rather than passing on a much larger estate than he wished to leave.

So the model needs a random number generator that produces a population of returns shaped similarly to the potential behavior of the markets as well as a reasonable method of modeling taxes expected along the way so we can then get a sense of how confident the client can be of exceeding his and her goals.

Finally, don’t assume that Monte Carlo is used uniformly accross the industry. Like many tools in the financial industry Monte Carlo can be used effectively to improve clients’ lives or it can be misused for sales purposes. For instance, beware of a confidence level approaching 100%. While it may sound appealing to hear that you have a 98% confidence of exceeding all of your important goals, what the model is suggesting is that 980 of the 1,000 trials left money in the client’s estate. Many of those ignored trials likely provided ample estates while allowing significantly more spending or giving during the clients' lifetimes.

Alternatively, Monte Carlo can be used effectively by the wealthy to quantify surplus that almost certainly exists among their resources - in other words a shortage of goals. These clients may be able to accomplish much more with their wealth today instead of leaving it trapped in managed and trust accounts overseen by advisors whose focus may be more asset-centric than client goal-centric.
  
In short, uncertainty can confuse and exact a heavy toll on lifestyles or it can be continually measured to provide for more abundant and purposeful lives.

Have a great weekend.